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TAXING CORPORATE
DISTRIBUTIONS OF APPRECIATED







One of the most fundamental, yet highly controversial, issues in
corporate income taxation involves the recognition of gain or loss to
a corporation that distributes appreciated or depreciated property
to its shareholders, either during its life or at liquidation. If the
corporation, as a separate legal entity for general tax purposes, is
allowed to exclude the putative gain on the premise that it has not
yet "realized" anything in return for the distribution (the purported
holding of the United States Supreme Court in General Utilities),
then a significant method for avoiding the normal two-tier tax (one
at the corporate level and another at the shareholder level) is cre-
ated. Though Congress codified the result in General Utilities,
mainly in sections 311 and 336 enacted in 1954, since that time it
has gradually eroded the doctrine, except as it relates to distribu-
tions in complete liquidations of corporations.
Professor Wolfman, discussing the principal recommendations of
the American Law Institute, states the case for outright repeal of
General Utilities and its statutory progeny. After tracing the history
of the doctrine, its procedural infirmities, and examples of abuse
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(where some corporations were able to avoid any corporate-level tax
during operations), he then describes how several complex Code sec-
tions may then be eliminated or simplified. In response to the argu-
ment that repeal of the doctrine could have negative effects on our
economy, Professor Wolfman asserts that he doubts the empirical
data.
Mr. Nolan states the case against repeal of General Utilities
where there is a sale or distribution of assets in complete liquida-
tion. He does, however, favor the imposition of a corporate-level tax
on "ordinary non-liquidating distributions."
Among the reasons he opposes repeal in the complete liquidation
context are (1) the rate of tax (at both corporate and shareholder
levels, assuming two capital gain taxes) would be increased from
20% to 42.4%, on gains which are essentially inflationary in na-
ture; (2) the simplification that could result from such a repeal
would have adverse economic effects not justified by a double tax
burden; (3) Congress would not tolerate outright repeal of General
Utilities and would either exempt capital gain and certain business
assets or would adopt a form of shareholder credit for the corpo-
rate gains tax; (4) a repeal of section 337 exempting liquidation-
period sales from tax at the corporate level would impose a higher
tax burden on those who invested in a corporation instead of a part-
nership; (5) closely held business corporations would be among the
biggest losers if repeal took place; (6) with all the capital formation
incentives now included in the tax structure, we in fact have only a
single-level ordinary tax on corporate earnings, and with the ability
of larger corporations to retain earnings, double taxation is not the
norm; and (7) the ambiguous nature of goodwill would be subject to
corporate-level tax, causing family-type businesses to sell out
rather than continue in partnership form.
Finally, Mr. Nolan asserts that the present regime of taxation
fosters important social and economic policies that Congress has
seen fit to adopt.
It is not surprising to find that the Senate Finance staff proposals
to restructure the taxation of corporate entities would also address
another long-standing problem - reclassifying ventures which
avoid corporate status for tax purposes by operating as partner-
ships. Partnerships, particularly publicly traded limited partner-
ships, are quite similar to corporations. Also, since some of these
publicly traded partnerships are utilized to syndicate tax shelters to
large groups of investors (where losses may be passed through to
investors), treating these types of partnerships as corporations
seemed a logical extension of the Senate staff proposals.
Mr. Hobbet discusses the reasons given for entity reclassification,
including reasons not stated in the staff report, and suggests that
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preservation of partnership status for publicly traded partnerships
would offer an opportunity to experiment with full integration treat-
ment for entities that might resemble corporations. Integration
would mean retaining the "tax-exempt" status of partnership-level
income or full pass-through of losses, permitting investors and pro-
moters to elect their tax regime. As Mr. Hobbet concludes, if Gen-
eral Utilities were repealed, taxpayers could choose the partnership
as an appropriate full integration system. By limiting the proposal
as the staff did, to reclassify only publicly traded partnerships, he
observes that tax-shelter-oriented smaller limited partnerships
would, in effect, be available to those wealthy enough to invest on
their own, an "anti-populist" development.

CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF
APPRECIATED PROPERTY: THE CASE FOR
REPEAL OF THE General Utilities
DOCTRINE
BERNARD WOLFMAN*
The outline I have provided has three segments (included as Ap-
pendix A). The first is a precis of the history and current state of the
so-called General Utilities' doctrine. The second is a brief summary
of the American Law Institute's analysis and proposals with respect
to that doctrine. The third contains excerpts from the Senate Fi-
nance Committee's proposals on the subject.
Like many of you, I grew up at the bar taking for granted the fact
that distributions of appreciated property were exempt from corpo-
rate tax. It was just that way! Since no rational response was appar-
ent, one did not ask why. It was the unreasoned Supreme Court
opinion by Justice McReynolds that gave the doctrine sufficient dig-
nity to permit it to survive and grow. One came to accept the doc-
trine as a given. I did not understand it, but I accepted it theologi-
cally; like creation, it was there.
I am not sure exactly when it was that I began to question
whether the doctrine had to be, but the time did come. At first I kept
my doubts to myself. Later, however, emboldened by the piece re-
ferred to earlier this morning, Jim Lewis's 1959 article in the Tax
Revision Compendium,2 I gained the courage to blaspheme. Crisply
* Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1946, J.D., 1948, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
1. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
2. Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in
Liquidation, in 3 TAX REvIsION COMPENDIUM 1643 (Comm. Print 1959).
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and cogently, Lewis's article argued for the elimination of the cen-
tral distortion of our corporate tax structure, the General Utilities
doctrine. It also described several of the possibilities for structural
simplification that might result from the doctrine's repeal.
To begin, let us go back to the doctrine itself and see how it
originated. In the early twenties, the Treasury regulations3 gave it
first breath in the context of a corporate liquidation. Without elabo-
ration the regulations announced that no gain or loss would be recog-
nized whenever a corporation distributed assets in liquidation, how-
ever they might have appreciated or depreciated. The Treasury gave
no reasons for the rule; it simply announced it.
Then, in 1935 the Treasury sought in the General Utilities case to
tax a corporation on its appreciation in the securities it distributed as
a dividend to its shareholders. Promptly upon receipt of the distribu-
tion the shareholders sold the securities to a waiting buyer pursuant
to arrangements that had been made by the distributing corporation
before the dividend had been declared. The Treasury lost before the
Supreme Court, producing a doctrine that provides for non-recogni-
tion of gain to a distributing corporation upon the distribution of
appreciated assets whether or not in liquidation.
I should mention that the argument the Government had ad-
vanced successfully in the court of appeals was not addressed by the
Supreme Court on its merits, but was ruled out-of-bounds because
the Government had not raised it when the case was before the Tax
Court. That argument was one the Court came to accept ten years
later, on its merits, in the Court Holding Company case.4 That case
holds that a corporation is taxable on the appreciation of its distrib-
uted assets if its shareholders consummate a sale of those assets in
circumstances that would lead a finder-of-fact to conclude the sale
had really been made by the corporation. That argument, as I have
noted, had been made successfully to the court of appeals in General
Utilities, but was then rejected by the Supreme Court on procedural
grounds.
In the aftermath of the doctrine there was questioning, dialogue
and debate, and a great deal of tax planning. Everyone in the tax
world knew that when Congress came to review the problems of cor-
porate taxation in 1954, the General Utilities doctrine would either
be overruled or codified. It was codified, and codification (in sections
3115 and 3366) became a major organizational premise of Sub-
chapter C. It, therefore, became obvious that Congress would have
to address the Court Holding Co. problem as well in order to relieve
3. See Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953).
4. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
5. I.R.C. § 311 (1982).
6. I.R.C. § 336 (1982).
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the arbitrariness of the results of that case. A corporation would be
taxed if there was sufficient evidence that the sale by shareholders
was pre-arranged and not taxed if the corporation could prove other-
wise. Thus, after deciding to codify General Utilities, Congress
thought it made sense in that context to enact section 3377 to exempt
a corporation from tax on its asset gain when realized upon a sale
that follows the corporation's adoption of a plan of complete
liquidation.
It is an interesting irony that in Justice McReynold's opinion in
General Utilities the Court looked to "sale" as the touchstone of re-
alization, justifying non-taxation in that case because no corporate
sale had occurred. Yet when doctrine was built around that touch-
stone, the Congressional response in section 337 was to eliminate the
tax even when the corporation sells! One cannot help wondering
whether Congress's prime concern should have been codification of
General Utilities as it was, or whether it should have been to assure
that unrealized appreciation, allowed to accrue untaxed prior to sale,
would be taxed to the corporation no later than the time the corpora-
tion distributes its appreciated assets to its shareholders. The Con-
gressional decision to codify General Utilities and enact section 337
has permitted a deferral of the corporate tax to turn into an
exemption.
As codified in sections 311 and 336, the General Utilities doctrine
is applicable not only to distributions of appreciated property that go
to shareholders pro rata, as a dividend or in liquidation, but, as the
Treasury regulations acknowledged promptly after the 1954 Code
was enacted, it is also applicable to distributions in redemption of
the distributing corporation's stock. Therefore, corporations could
distribute appreciated, marketable securities in order to redeem a
shareholder's stock. In the typical redemption case there would be a
capital gains tax at the shareholder level with no tax at the corporate
level. The shareholder would be free to sell the securities immedi-
ately, without further tax.
In 1969 Congress decided quite directly to cut back on the reach
of the General Utilities doctrine. But, let us look first at a flanking,
indirect slash at the doctrine that had occurred much earlier. In
1950, four years before it codified the doctrine, Congress enacted the
first collapsible corporation provision, section 117(m) of the 1939
Code, later to become section 3418 of the 1954 Code. Congress did
7. I.R.C. § 337 (1982).
8. I.R.C. § 341 (1982).
so because it had become aware of the fact that corporations were
being utilized to produce or purchase assets that appreciated rapidly.
Then, before the corporations realized any significant amount of tax-
able income, they disposed of their assets, by sale or distribution,
free of corporate tax. A doctrine called Kimbell-Diamond9 permitted
the purchaser of a corporate enterprise to step up the basis of its
assets to cost, without corporate tax, whether the purchaser acquired
stock from the corporate shareholders or assets directly from their
corporation.
Congress found abuse in the situation in which there had been
virtually no corporate income tax paid during operations, and yet the
corporation was permitted to transfer its assets to a new corporation
without tax. The price for this beneficence was only a single capital
gains tax at the shareholder level. Perhaps Congress thought the
abuse was limited to only a few industries, like the motion picture
and real estate industries, and that a collapsible corporation provi-
sion would deal with it adequately. In any event, Congress did not
focus on the heart of the problem: the ability of a corporation to rid
itself of its highly appreciated assets without a corporate tax. In-
stead, it focused on the shareholder, converting his stock, normally a
capital asset, into an ordinary income asset. As a result, since 1950
we have had an extraordinarily dense and complex provision affect-
ing collapsible corporations, one which some tax lawyers have man-
aged to ignore throughout their professional lives. To them it
presents no problem. Other lawyers are burdened by it, especially if
they have had clients struck by it. Of course, the statute has its relief
provisions, section 341(e) for example. Marty Ginsburg understands
it, but I am not sure that anyone else does. Strangely enough, how-
ever, even Marty may have tired of it. He is willing to give it up in
exchange for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
The repeal of the doctrine embodied in sections 311 and 336
would justify the repeal of section 341. There are some who say that
even after the demise of General Utilities, section 341, or something
like it, would be necessary to prevent a shareholder's use of a corpo-
ration to convert what would have been ordinary income in his hands
into a corporate capital gain. They may be right, but I think the
conversion possibility is an insufficient reason for keeping the section
341 monster. Two taxes, one at the corporate level and the other at
the shareholder level, even though they both may be imposed at only
capital gain rates, would seem to me to justify the complete repeal of
section 341. If we could rid the law of the General Utilities doctrine
by repealing sections 311, 336, and 337, we should then also feel
9. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74, affd per curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
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comfortable with a simplification of section 33810 that would elimi-
nate all of its consistency requirements.
As I began to say earlier, in 1969 Congress restricted the reach of
General Utilities and imposed corporate tax on the appreciation in
property which a corporation distributed as stock to effect certain
redemptions. The 1982 TEFRA legislation added to the number of
redemption situations in which the corporate tax would apply. The
statute has grown in both length and complexity because Congress
has chosen to deal with so-called abuse cases instead of going to the
heart of the problem." It has created a maze that only experts can
work their way through. It makes busy work for all of us, and it
leaves us with a monstrous statute. We have a doctrine that fosters
distortion and a law that lacks coherence. It works arbitrarily. Why,
then, do we keep the General Utilities doctrine? Will Jack Nolan tell
and persuade us?
An important equity issue is embedded in the problem we have
been discussing. It seems unfair that if some corporations are to be
taxed on their gain, all are not. Today, corporations are taxed if they
sell their appreciated assets and continue their corporate life; if they
give up their charter, they avoid corporate tax even though the assets
will remain in corporate solution at a stepped-up basis, with different
shareholders. There is no explanation for taxing those corporations
that stay alive and use the proceeds of sale for reinvestment in other
productive assets while forgiving the tax on appreciation if the corpo-
ration surrenders its charter.
Some would say that our system is essentially one of partial inte-
gration, that in important situations we have but one level of tax, not
two. Well, let us assume that we are all integrationists, and therefore
favor the elimination of the corporate tax. Also, let us assume that
we favor partial integration if we cannot have complete integration.
Is our present system anything like the partial integration system we
would want if we set out to create one? We have opportunities for
some corporations some of the time to avoid the corporate tax while
others are never able to do so. Can one call that a "system" of par-
tial integration or anything else?
Some people would find it inappropriate to repeal the General
10. I.R.C. § 338 (1982).
11. Section 54 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 enlarged the area of taxability of
corporate distributions in non-liquidating distributions, further eroding the General Utili-
ties doctrine. See I.R.C. § 311 (d) as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, § 354, 98 Stat. 494, 568-69 (1984).
Utilities doctrine because it would result in an overall increase in
corporate tax revenues. However, if our world were one in which all
appreciation were taxed to all corporations and we were thereby go-
ing to collect more corporate tax than we wanted, we could share the
surplus by reducing the corporate tax across the board. As matters
stand now, that potential surplus is distributed, in effect, to those
corporations that manage to go through their corporate lives with
assets appreciating, and, through the talents of people like us, they
avoid paying dividends despite the overhanging threat of the section
53112 tax. Then they arrive at that sad day when we are supposed to
feel very sorry for them. The corporation is dying! It is liquidating!
And these evil people from the ALI want to impose a tax on this
dead body, a tax on the appreciation that has accrued during its life.
If you feel sorry for the dead corporation you will not want to
repeal General Utilities. As I see it, the decedent corporation is one
that managed quite successfully to maneuver through its corporate
existence without paying tax on real income that accrued during its
ownership of the appreciating assets. It has probably paid no divi-
dends. It has managed, with the kind of help we are all trained so
well to provide, to avoid tax under section 531. Is it not time, then,
for the corporation to share some of the benefits of the deferral it
was permitted to enjoy throughout its life?
We all know that some of the complexity comes not only from the
1969 and later laws dealing with redemptions, but from the recap-
ture provisions as well. Additionally, we have the Bliss Dairy3 ex-
ceptions. There is old case law like that embodied in Standard Pav-
ing14 and similar decisions which seem to call for taxation of a
decedent corporation. All of that makes for a wonderful course to
teach. It creates a scarce resource, producing tax lawyers who are
highly specialized and highly rewarded. But is the candle worth the
penny? Not as I see it.
The ALI proposals impress me as a simplifying and elegant re-
form that would bring coherence to a classical, double tax system.
Their enactment would do nothing to suggest that we ought not
move to integration when and if we want to. However, it would sug-
gest that when we do, we should adopt an integration system. Until
we do, we should make the system we have into one that is fair and
equitable.
I am not going to play the game of trying to anticipate Jack No-
lan's arguments and then answering them before he gets up to make
them. I am tempted, but we have been friends too long. I will just
12. I.R.C. § 531 (1982).
13. United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
14. Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 860 (1951).
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mention one argument that I have heard, and then I will spend a few
minutes on the so-called relief provisions. It has been suggested that
there would be a negative effect on our economy if we were to im-
pose a tax on the distribution of appreciated property-that it would
somehow create a drag. I do not know what the data are for that
proposition or whether there is any empirical basis for it at all.
For purposes of this discussion, I assume that all taxes are likely
to take money out of the productive private sector. I would think
that if we are looking for a tax system that is relatively non-distor-
tive and relatively neutral, one that in seeking to provide incentives,
focuses on them and has a way of checking on whether they succeed,
we would work to eliminate the General Utilities doctrine. That doc-
trine distorts economic behavior. Corporations that might otherwise
continue are liquidated only for tax reasons and it produces transac-
tion costs that are unnecessary. By taxing all corporate gain by the
time a corporation liquidates, if not before, we would reduce the im-
portance of the corporate tax in business decisions.
As a final matter, let us examine the so-called relief provisions
that are offered to ameliorate those conditions that repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine might bring, conditions which some people
feel may be too extreme. At the outset, however, let me say that if I
had my druthers I would not support any of the relief provisions, and
that includes the ALI proposal for a shareholder credit. All I would
favor would be sensible transition and phase-in rules. However, I am
not persuaded that any permanent exemption is justified.
If I were nevertheless to move in the direction of "relief," I would
be attracted to Jim Lewis's proposal for the expansion of the section
333 notion of carrying over the basis of the shareholder's stock, thus
deferring his individual tax. What worries me about that, of course,
is the prospect of section 101415 turning the deferral into an
exemption.
A second-best option would be ALI-recommended shareholder
credit. There are aspects of the credit that could cause a significant
and unjustified loss of revenue in favor of a narrow band of share-
holders. And I think the proposal is somewhat complex. Neverthe-
less, given the range of relief provisions that have been talked about,
I think that the credit is well worth serious consideration. Like Jim
15. I.R.C. § 1014 (1982).
Lewis's relief proposal, it does nothing to impair the integrity of the
corporate tax which complete repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
would restore.
APPENDIX A
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF APPRECIATED
PROPERTY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL OF THE GENERAL
UTILITIES DOCTRINE
BERNARD WOLFMAN
I. History and Current Law1
A. Before the 1954 Code
1. Liquidating distributions: The Treasury Regulations provided that
"No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere distribu-
tion of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation, however,
they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their acqui-
sition." Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20.
2. Nonliquidating distributions: The Supreme Court rejected the
Treasury's effort to treat a dividend-in-kind of appreciated property
as a realization by the distributing corporation. General Utilities &
Operating Co. v. Helvering (see text page 5). The effect was to have
the same rule of nonrealization for dividend distributions of appreci-
ated property as for liquidating distributions.
B. The 1954 Code - pre-1969
1. The General Utilities doctrine was codified in section 311 (a) to pro-
vide that as to nonliquidating distributions, a distributing corpora-
tion would not recognize gain or loss on a distribution "with respect
to its stock." Section 336(a) provided similarly for distributions in
complete or partial liquidations. But there were exceptions.
2. Section 311(a) excepted the distribution of installment obligations
from corporate tax immunity, and sections 311 (b) and (c) provided
exceptions to the general nonrecognition rule in the case of distribu-
tions of LIFO inventory and property subject to liabilities in excess
of basis. Section 336 had an exception for the distribution of install-
ment obligations.
3. In Reg. section 1.311-1 (a) the Treasury conceded'that a redemption
distribution constituted a "distribution with respect to . . . stock"
within the meaning - and protection - of section 311 (a).
C. From 1969 to 1982
1. In 1969 Congress added subsection (d)(1) to section 311 to provide
that, in general, distributions of appreciated property in redemption
of the distributing corporation's stock would result in recognition of
the gain to the distributing corporation, except in the following situ-
ations for which the immunity of section 311(a) and Reg. section
1.311-1(a) was continued:
a. a redemption in complete termination of a shareholder's interest
(within the meaning of section 302(b)(3)), if he had owned at
1. Excerpted from B. WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISE, 6-8 (2d ed. Supp. 1984).
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least 10% of the corporation's stock for the twelve-month period
ending on the date of the redemption distribution. §
31 l(d) (2) (A);
b. a distribution of the stock or obligation of a corporation en-
gaged in business, if it had not received a substantial portion of
its assets in a section 351 transaction within the five-year period
ending on the distribution date and if at least 50% of its stock
had been owned by the distributing corporation at any time
within the nine-year period ending one year before the distribu-
tion. ]] 311(d)(2)(B);
c. a distribution pursuant to certain antitrust decrees. §
311(d)(2)(C);
d. a distribution to which section 303(a) applied. § 311(d)(2)(D);
e. a distribution to a private foundation. § 311(d)(2)(E);
f. a distribution by a regulated investment company. §
311(d)(2)(F); and
g. a distribution pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act. §
311 (d)(2)(G).
D. After TEFRA
1. Distributions in complete liquidation: Under section 336, appreci-
ated property distributions in complete liquidation remain immune
from tax at the corporate level. There are exceptions, however, and
gain is recognized
a. as to a distributed installment obligation unless section 332 cov-
ers the liquidation or the obligation was acquired in a section
337 sale. § 453(a), (d)(1), (2);
b. as to "LIFO recapture amount[s]" if the plan of liquidation was
adopted after 1981 (section 336(b)) but limited to sums in ex-
cess of $1,000,000 if the plan was adopted in 1982 and com-
pleted by the end of 1983 (P.L. 97-362, § 101); and
c. as to recapture amounts, as under pre-TEFRA law. See subpart
E, infra.
2. Distributions NOT in complete liquidation: If the distributions are
not in redemption or partial liquidation, they are exempt, as before
TEFRA, under section 311(a), unless they are within one of the
exceptions of section 311(b) or (c) or section 453B. Distributions in
partial liquidation, however, are no longer protected from corporate
tax by section 336, and section 311(d)(1) continues the general rule
that, since 1969, has taxed appreciation in redemption distributions.
However, section 311(d)(2), as reconstituted by TEFRA, has the
following six exceptions to the recognition rule of section 311 (d)(1):
a. Distributions from one corporation to another, if the distribu-
tion is a dividend so that the distributee takes a carryover basis
in the distributed assets under section 301(d)(2). §
311(d)(2)(A).
b. Distributions to a noncorporate shareholder (including an S
Corporation), if the distribution is in "partial liquidation," as
defined in section 302(b)(4), and is made with respect to "quali-
fied stock," as defined in section 311(e) and section
311(d)(2)(B). The section 302(b)(4) definition is substantially
as it was in pre-TEFRA section 346(a)(2). "Qualified stock," a
new term, is stock held by a noncorporate shareholder (includ-
ing an S corporation (section 1371(a) (2)) who held at least 10%
in value of the distributing corporation's outstanding stock for
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the lesser of the period of the distributing corporation's exis-
tence (and that of a predecessor) or the five-year period ending
on the date of distribution. The section 318 attribution rules ap-
ply liberally, with "family" embracing any individual (and
spouse of any individual) described in section 267(c)(4). §
311(e).
c. Distribution of the stock or obligation of a corporation ("con-
trolled corporation"), if
(i) the distribution is with respect to "qualified stock," as
previously defined,
(ii) substantially all the assets of the controlled corporation
consist of the assets of one or more "qualified busi-
ness [es],"
(iii) no substantial part of the controlled corporation's "non-
business asset[s]" was acquired from the distributing cor-
poration in a section 351 or capital contribution transac-
tion within the five-year period ending on the date of dis-
tribution, and
(iv) more than 50% in value of the stock of the controlled cor-
poration is distributed by the distributing corporation
with respect to "qualified stock." (A "qualified business"
is any trade or business that was actively conducted for
the five-year period ending on the distribution date and
was not acquired in a taxable transaction. A "non-busi-
ness asset" is one not used in the active conduct of a trade
or business. §§ 311(d)(2)(C), (e)(2).)
d. The section 303, private foundation, and mutual fund redemp-
tion exceptions of pre-TEFRA law. § 311(d)(2)(D), (E), and
(F).
3. S Corporations: All gain is recognized on the distribution of appre-
ciated assets by an S corporation. § 1363(d).
E. Recapture - Before and After TEFRA
Notwithstanding otherwise applicable rules of nonrecognition, there have
been recapture requirements for the following: depreciation (sections
1245 and 1250), farm losses (section 1251), soil and water conservation
and land clearing expenses (section 1252), intangible drilling costs (sec-
tion 1254), conservation payments (section 617), and investment tax
credit (section 47). The recapture rules are not applicable to those com-
plete liquidations and certain other situations in which basis is carried
over, and to certain consolidated return cases.
II. The American Law Institute ProposaP
A. Proposal C1 - Gain or Loss on Cost-Basis Transfers
1. General Rule - Except as specifically otherwise provided, gain or
loss shall be recognized on any corporate transfer of assets, by dis-
tribution in kind to shareholders or sale in the course of liquidation
2. Excerpted from AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT,
SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE ACQUI-
SITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS, 116-
17, 135-37 (1982).
or otherwise, in which basis does not carry over. In computing gain
or loss on any distribution in kind to shareholders, the fair market
value of the property distributed shall be considered to be the
amount realized.
2. Exceptions and Qualifications - Exceptions to and qualifications of
the general rule in paragraph 1 are contained in -
a. Proposal C2 - Unallocated Premium in Cost-Basis Transfers;
b. Proposal C3 - Limited Credit to Shareholders for Corporate
Tax on liquidating Capital Gains;
c. Section 1031 - Like-Kind Exchanges;
d. Section 1033 - Involuntary Conversions;





The main import of this proposal is to reject the general rule
that a corporation does not realize gain by making a distribu-
tion to shareholders. The rejected rule is generally attributed to
the Supreme Court decision in General Utilities & Operating
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), and so it is convenient to
think of the proposal as rejecting the General Utilities decision.
The proposal would generally require recognition of gain in
the case of all distributions of appreciated property, whether in
liquidation or in redemption of shares or as a dividend, and
whether or not in connection with an acquisition by any other
party. In addition to requiring recognition of gain on any distri-
bution of appreciated property, the proposal would repeal sec-
tion 337 in reference to cost-basis sales, since that provision's
purpose is to treat sales in the course of complete liquidation
like distributions in kind.
B. Proposal C3 - Shareholder Credit for Corporate Tax on Liquidating
Capital Gains
1. General Rule - Any shareholder receiving a liquidating distribu-
tion from a corporation shall be allowed a credit against tax for his
proportionate share of the corporation's liquidating capital-gain tax.
2. Limitation - The credit shall not exceed the amount by which the
shareholder's tax liability would be reduced if his gain on the liqui-
dation were excluded in computing his income tax.
3. Definition - "Liquidating capital-gain tax" means the amount by
which a corporation's tax liability (and that of any subsidiaries, in-
cluding any subsidiary disposed of or acquired on a cost basis as
provided in Proposal C4) for the year of liquidation and the next
preceding taxable year would be reduced by excluding all gains
from disposition of capital assets and section 1231 assets, except any
such assets (other than goodwill and similar intangibles) whose
manufacture, construction, production or purchase was not substan-
tially completed at least five years prior to disposition. The amount
excluded under the last sentence shall not exceed, however, the ex-
cess of all capital gains and section 1231 gains over capital losses
and section 1231 losses for that one of the following periods for
which such excess is smallest:
a. the taxable year of liquidation and the next preceding taxable
year;
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b. the taxable year of liquidation and the next two preceding taxa-
ble years; and
c. the taxable year of liquidation and the next three preceding tax-
able years.
4. Sale of Shares - Any shareholder who realizes and recognizes a
gain on a sale of shares of a corporation which is subsequently com-
pletely liquidated within the calendar year of such sale or the next
succeeding calendar year, or which is treated as being liquidated
under Proposal C4, shall be entitled to a credit against tax for his
proportionate share of the corporation's liquidating capital-gain tax,
decreased by the excess, if any, of liquidating distributions ulti-
mately made with respect to his shares over the amount realized by
him on their sale. Such credit shall not exceed the amount by which
such shareholder's tax liability would be reduced if his gain on the
sale of his shares were excluded in computing his income tax.
5. Comments
a. Basic Rationale
This proposal responds to the notion that certain gains realized
in connection with a corporate liquidation should not be taxed
at both corporate and individual investor levels. But it responds
by way of a credit for the corporate tax rather than exemption,
just as the foreign-tax credit responds to the problem of double
taxation of foreign income. Its effect, therefore, is to require
that gain on a corporate liquidation be effectively taxed once,
either at the corporation's capital-gain rate and by reference to
the corporate basis, or at the investor's rate by reference to his
basis, whichever produces the higher tax.
In practical terms, this proposal would provide relief from
double taxation on a liquidating sale without subjecting the to-
tal tax burden to what may be felt to be defects in the individ-
ual income tax, particularly as it applies to dispositions of in-
vestments in closely held corporations. When a closely held
corporation is disposed of, for example, most of the stock may
have belonged to a recent decedent. In such a case individual
capital gains will have been largely eliminated by the step-up of
basis provided in section 1014. Or stock may have been recently
conveyed to trusts with low tax rates. Under this proposal, upon
a sale or distribution of corporate assets, all gain that has not
previously been taxed would be taxed at least at the applicable
corporate capital-gain rate. In some cases, of course, that tax
could be avoided by selling corporate stock instead of assets, but
such a stock sale would not produce a stepped-up basis for cor-
porate assets.
III. Senate Finance Committee Staff Proposals3
A. Corporate Treatment of Cost Basis Acquisitions
1. Recognition of gain
Corporations which choose to acquire assets with fair market value
3. Excerpted from S. REP. No. 95, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
basis would be permitted to do so only through transactions fully
taxable at the corporate level. Thus, if the acquiring corporation ac-
quires all of the target corporation's assets for cash, the acquired
corporation would be required to recognize all gain on the acquired
assets (unless the acquiring corporation and the target corporation
expressly elect nonrecognition and a carryover basis). Under present
law, there would generally be a step-up in basis without recognition
of gain if the target liquidates, except to the extent of recapture,
LIFO reserves, and amounts taxed under the tax benefit, assignment
of income, or clear reflection of income doctrines.
Similarly, if the acquiring corporation acquires the target corpo-
ration through a merger or if the acquiring corporation acquires
stock constituting control of the target corporation, the transaction
may be done on a cost basis and, in such event, the target corpora-
tion would recognize all gain on its assets. The mechanism for mak-
ing the election and the special rules that apply for cost basis acqui-
sitions of stock have been described above.
Under a cost basis acquisition, the unrealized gain or loss in all of
the target corporation's assets would be recognized; the parties
could not choose a carryover basis treatment for some T assets and
cost basis treatment for other assets. As described above, an excep-
tion would be provided for unallocated acquisition premium (i.e.,
amounts, such as goodwill, that represent the excess of the purchase
price over the value of the assets acquired). In addition, nonrecogni-
tion and carryover basis treatment could be separately elected for
stock in foreign corporations and DISC's.
The recognition rules of section 338 would be conformed to the
general rules, as discussed below.
2. Basis of assets and stock acquired
In the case of a cost basis asset acquisition, the assets will take a
basis equal to their fair market value. In the case of an acquisition
by merger in a cost basis transaction, the assets will also take a fair
market value basis. Finally, in the case of an acquisition of stock,
both the subsidiary's assets and the stock of the subsidiary will take
a fair market value basis. If in any of such cases the acquired corpo-
ration and the target corporation elect carryover basis for the
purchase premium, then the amount of such premium that is not
taxed is excluded from the basis of the assets. Such amount would
also be excluded from the basis of the stock acquired, if any.
B. Repeal of General Utilities Doctrine
1. General Rule
Corporations would generally recognize gain on the distribution of
appreciated property to shareholders (whether as dividends or in
redemption of stock) without regard to the limitations of section
311(d)(2) (including distributions to which section 302(b)(4)
applies).
Example IV-40:
X corporation owns appreciated oil reserves with a basis of $100
and a fair market value of $300, together with other assets. X is
owned by ten equal shareholders. X distributes the oil reserves
to its shareholders as a dividend in kind. Under present law, X
would recognize no income to the extent the distribution was
covered by earnings and profits, thereafter as a return of capital
to the extent of basis, and finally as capital gain to the extent of
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any excess. Under the proposal, X would recognize $200 of cap-
ital gain on the distribution.
Thus, the special rules of section 311(e) enacted in 1982 would be
repealed. In the case of distributions to corporations, the basis rule
of section 301(d) would continue to apply and no gain would be
recognized by the corporation (because the transaction is a carry-
over basis transfer).
2. Effective date
The provision generally would apply to distributions made after De-
cember 31, 1983, with an exception for distributions made pursuant
to a binding contract entered into before thirty days after the date
of enactment. If transitional relief were provided, the capital gains
tax on historic assets would be phased in over twelve years as under
the acquisition and liquidation proposals.
C. Relief From Repeal of General Utilities
In addition to the preceding recommendations, the staff has identified a
number of options that ought to be considered if the committee concludes
that the outright repeal of the General Utilities rule is too harsh. If the
problem is characterized as a transitional problem, then relief could be
provided by phasing-in the capital gains tax on liquidations. If, instead,
the problem is characterized as a permanent problem, at least five types
of options are available. Under the American Law Institute proposals a
shareholder credit would be provided for the shareholder's pro rata share
of the capital gains tax paid by the corporation. Second, certain historic
assets could be exempted from corporate level tax. Those assets could be
all assets which produce capital gain, or the relief could be limited to
capital non-depreciable assets. Third, an election could be provided on
distributions in kind in liquidation to permit the deferral of one or both of
the taxes until the assets were disposed of by the shareholders. Fourth,
the corporate capital gains tax rate might be reduced. Fifth, the individ-
ual capital gains tax on stock might be reduced. Finally, the committee
might conclude that no relief is appropriate. All of these are options that
the committee may wish to consider.

TAXING CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF
APPRECIATEDPROPERTY: REPEAL OF THE
General Utilities DOCTRINE AND RELIEF
MEASURES
JOHN S. NOLAN*
I strongly oppose repeal of the General Utilities' concept with re-
spect to a sale or distribution of assets in the course of a complete
liquidation. As has been suggested, the effect of such repeal would
be to revoke sections 3362 and 3373 and, to the extent that section
3384 is part of section 337, much of the practical effect of section
338 and section 334(b)(2) 5 before it. The result of such repeal would
be to increase the rate of tax on gains which are essentially invest-
ment or inflationary gains. The imposition of this double tax burden
would cause a rate increase from 20% to 42.4%. Despite the many
perceived simplification gains that could flow from such change, the
adverse economic effects of more than doubling the capital gain rate
on this element of corporate investment are too great, and the sim-
plification gains are uncertain. The existing effects of sections 336,
337, and 338 in providing for a single tax burden on the distribution
or sale of assets upon termination of a corporate business in complete
liquidation reflect good tax policy and should not be disturbed.
This is not to say that no changes should be made. The provisions
* Partner, Miller & Chevalier, Chartered, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, 1969-71; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
2. I.R.C. § 336 (1982).
3. I.R.C. § 337 (1982).
4. I.R.C. § 338 (1982).
5. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1982).
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of the pending House and Senate bills that would impose a corpo-
rate-level tax on ordinary non-liquidating distributions of appreci-
ated property are sound. There is no strong tax policy reason to ex-
empt a gain in such cases from the corporate level tax. Non-
liquidating corporate distributions are ordinarily made in cash, and
if the corporation will continue in existence, the corporate-level gain
may appropriately be taxed as if the corporation had sold the prop-
erty and then made a cash distribution. Indeed, it was for this reason
that section 337 was limited to distributions in complete liquidation
in the 1954 Code.
The gain with respect to inventory or other property primarily
held for sale to customers upon a sale or distribution of those assets
in the course of a complete liquidation should also be taxed. Thus,
the bulk sale inventory rule in the present section 337 should be re-
pealed. These gains arise from ordinary ongoing business activity of
the corporation and should be taxed as ordinary income even in the
context of a complete liquidation. To the extent that we do have a
two-tiered tax system for corporate income from ordinary business
operations where the income is distributed to the shareholders, it
properly applies to such income that is distributed in liquidation as
well.
Congress acted in 1980 to amend sections 336 and 337 to tax the
LIFO reserve in complete liquidations. There is no compelling reason
to treat FIFO inventory gains any more favorably. The present bills
limit the General Utilities concept so that it does not apply to non-
liquidating distributions, except in the case of spin-offs or distribu-
tions to an 80% or more corporate parent shareholder. The taxation I
have suggested of all inventory gains at the corporate level, even in
the course of complete liquidations, would achieve significant simpli-
fication gains sought by the proponents of repeal of the General Util-
ities concept. Beyond such a framework, however, there might well
be no simplification gains. Congress and affected taxpayers will not
tolerate the adverse economic effects of repeal of sections 336, 337,
and 338 so as to increase the capital gains rate resulting from a com-
plete liquidation from 20% to 42.4%. Congress would either exempt
capital assets and section 12316 assets that were held for more than
some period of years, such as three years, or would adopt some form
of shareholder credit for the corporate capital gains tax. Either step
would leave in place many of the complexities and uncertainties of
existing law which the opponents of General Utilities seek to
eliminate.
The acid test of the desirability of repeal may be simply illus-
trated. A group of investors contribute one million dollars to a corpo-
6. I.R.C. § 1231 (1982).
[VOL. 22: 97, 1985] Relief Measures
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ration. They construct a building and operate it for rental income for
a long period of years. The value of the building increases to three
million dollars because of inflation or general increase in real estate
values. The investors decide to sell their investment. If section 337
were repealed they would incur an effective tax burden of 42.4% on
the two million dollars of appreciation as opposed to 20% that they
would have incurred if they had operated through a partnership or
had made a comparable alternative investment. There is no tax pol-
icy reason supporting the increase in taxation of the gain derived
from corporate investment which did not result from ongoing busi-
ness activities of the corporation. Actually, if the investors had held
the building prior to incorporation and it had appreciated in value at
that time, the problem would be exacerbated because the pre-incor-
poration gain would also be subject to the double tax burden.
This example reflects a widespread problem in the real world that
would result from repealing the General Utilities concept. There are
a very large number of closely held businesses in the United States
holding section 1231 assets which have been used for many years in
the corporate business, and have appreciated substantially in value.
The real estate involved might be a manufacturing plant or retail
store location, rather than a building held for rental. The appreci-
ated assets might instead be patents or some unique collection of
personal property which is not readily replaceable and has increased
in value, such as a specialized manufacturing facility.
The treatment of goodwill and going concern value by the propo-
nents of repeal is ambiguous. In theory, this gain should also be
taxed at the corporate level if other unrealized gains in corporate
assets are to be taxed on a sale or distribution in complete liquida-
tion. The Senate Finance Committee Subchapter C staff report, pro-
posed, however, that in a so-called cost basis acquisition in which
gain would be recognized at the corporate level in a complete liqui-
dation, unallocated acquisition premium or goodwill would not be
taxed at the corporate level but would be given a carryover basis.
That, however, would not solve the problem as to intangible assets
other than goodwill, such as patents and trademarks, and could cre-
ate new controversies as to what is goodwill. For example, the ques-
tion would then arise whether know-how, trade secrets, trade names
and the like are to be treated in the same manner as patents or
trademarks, or as part of some unallocated premium. Furthermore,
7. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983).
the acquiring company might well discount their value for the ab-
sence of a stepped-up basis, since they may be sold by it in the fu-
ture. If that were so, the shareholders of the target company would
still bear an implicit tax burden at the corporate level.
Finally, the treatment of such goodwill value in complete liquida-
tions involving distribution of assets in kind is also unclear. If the
parties seek to liquidate their corporation, and operate their business
as a partnership, the absence of section 336 would cause the value of
such assets to be taxed at the corporate level. This could result in the
parties being forced to sell their business to others or finding some
other way to avoid the double tax burden as to such asset values.
The central argument of the proponents of repeal is that we have
a two-tiered tax system in which income is to be taxed both at the
corporate level and the shareholder level, and that the General Utili-
ties concept is contrary to that system. In fact, however, we have
never had a truly unintegrated corporate tax system in which tax is
paid at the corporate level and a second tax is paid on corporate
income by the shareholders. Over the seventy or more years that our
corporate income tax system has developed, we have had a compro-
mise system in which a double tax has been imposed only on ordi-
nary earnings from regular operations to the extent that they are
distributed to the shareholders as dividends. Only a single tax has
been imposed upon extraordinary events, such as a sale or distribu-
tion of assets pursuant to a complete liquidation. In reality, to a
large extent, as Peter Faber suggested earlier this morning, we have
had only a single ordinary income tax on regular corporate earnings
because of the ability to retain earnings. By reason of our provision
for a step-up in basis of assets at death, earnings which had been
taxed at ordinary rates at the corporate level have to a large extent
been retained and have not been taxed again at the shareholder
level. At most they have been subjected to a capital gains tax on sale
of the stock at the shareholder level. A large percentage of corpora-
tions in the United States, both publicly held and privately held, re-
tain and reinvest in their businesses a large percentage of their an-
nual earnings, partly as a result of the tax advantages to their
shareholders that flow from this policy.
This is an entirely healthy system. The top corporate tax rate and
the top individual rate are roughly the same. There should be limits
on the taxation of income from capital so that capital formation is
not inhibited or misdirected away from business investment. Further-
more, to the extent that we provide incentives through tax al-
lowances such as the investment credit, ACRS, the research and de-
velopment credit, or the intangible drilling cost deduction, there
should be no preference for operating in or out of the corporate
structure. Virtually all major foreign industrialized countries, includ-
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ing the entire European Economic Community and Canada, have
moved toward a single integrated tax structure in which only a single
income tax is paid on business earnings. Economists tend to favor
such a system to avoid undue burdens on capital investment. We
have greatly moderated our double tax burden on capital by the
types of incentives previously mentioned, and as a practical matter
the effect of our present corporate tax structure is that, by a variety
of means, we have achieved what is a single tax on the returns from
capital. This allows us to remain competitive in the world economy.
There is no important reason at this time to disturb this carefully
developed balance that has resulted from seventy or more years of
experience in refining our corporate tax system to accomodate the
needs of our economy and our society. It is particularly unwise to do
so in a way that would impact harshly on privately held smaller
companies. The primary consideration affecting our corporate tax
structure should be economic efficiency, not simplicity or undue con-
cern with abuse and manipulation that we have been able to control
by other means.
It is important to recognize that the impact of repeal of sections
336, 337 and the principal effect of 338 would be largely on closely
held family businesses. Large publicly held corporations seldom un-
dergo complete liquidations. The short-term effect would be to bias
the decision of these families in favor of merging their family com-
panies into large publicly held corporations in a tax free exchange
for stock of those companies, rather than allocating their capital to
other uses that might be more efficient. If that were so, the tax law
would further interfere with market allocation of capital. In the long
run, businesses might tend to avoid incorporation wherever possible.
Our capital markets, which are the largest and most efficient in the
world, are based on financial instruments of corporations, not those
of unincorporated businesses. These markets might adjust, but at a
significant cost in the capital formation process. New instruments
subject to new dimensions of risk would be required to replace our
existing corporate capital instruments.
Many family businesses in the United States hold a wide range of
business assets, including real estate from which the business is oper-
ated. Mostly as a result of inflation these assets are likely to have
appreciated substantially in value over a long period of years. Many
family companies have been operated through several family genera-
tions, thus greatly increasing the inflationary components of these
gains. Even though the family company may have been operated for
many years, the family may have become so large, or the interests of
different family members may have become so diverse, that it may
.make greater economic sense for the family to liquidate the corpora-
tion, possibly selling all or a part of its assets or selling their stock,
and then to undertake other business ventures. It may have become
economically more efficient for third parties to acquire the business.
There are a wide range of reasons why it may become appropriate
for the family to terminate its corporate activities by complete
liquidation.
These families have operated on the basis of certain fundamental
assumptions as to our taxing system as it has existed for the last fifty
years, even prior to the time that the General Utilities case was de-
cided in 1935. Those assumptions include a clear understanding that
under our tax system, upon a decision to completely liquidate the
business, they could do so and incur only a single capital gains tax
on the appreciation in value of the underlying assets of the business.
This has been the case whether they sell those assets to third parties
or take their respective shares of the assets in kind to operate as sole
proprietorships or as partnerships. In such a case they seek to put
their capital to its most efficient uses in our economy.
A single capital gains tax on this terminal transaction, as if the
gain had arisen from other investment assets held by them, is en-
tirely appropriate. Much of the gain is probably inflationary gain,
and thus it deserves only a single corporate capital gains tax. Even
the balance of the gain which is likely to be attributable to real as-
sets or intangible assets is by its nature essentially an investment
gain and not a gain attributable to a regular business activity that is
typically taxed at higher rates. A tax of 42.4% on this gain is not
justified. The result would be that families wishing to terminate their
family businesses effectively will have one option: to find a publicly
held corporation and take its stock for their company. A publicly
held corporation with tax losses created by ACRS deductions or oth-
erwise, or with unuseable investment credits, presumably could elect
to step-up the basis of the assets at the corporate level in a so-called
cost basis acquisition using its own stock at only a minimal tax cost.
It is important to recognize that tax will be paid at the share-
holder level on the appreciation in value of assets held by the corpo-
ration in a complete liquidation except to the extent that the Code
provides explicitly for tax exemption to serve other social or eco-
nomic policies. The shareholders' gain on liquidation consists of two
elements, retained earnings and appreciation in value of the com-
pany's underlying assets. The shareholder may, of course, have
bought his shares at a time when such elements already existed to
some degree. If so, his predecessor will have paid tax at the share-
holder level on such elements. Retained earnings and appreciation in
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value of corporate assets ultimately always incur a tax at the share-
holder level, except to the extent the stepped-up basis at death oc-
curs or the shareholder is tax exempt. Furthermore the recapture
rules insure that the ordinary income portion of asset appreciation
ultimately is taxed as ordinary income. Retained earnings by defini-
tion have already been taxed at the corporate level. What remains is
the capital gains portion of the appreciation in value of corporate
assets, which ultimately is taxed at the shareholder level except
where there has been an intervening death of the shareholder or
where the shareholder is a tax-exempt organization or person. Re-
peal of General Utilities in the case of complete liquidations would
tax this appreciation twice, whereas if the business had been oper-
ated in noncorporate form this double tax would not have been
incurred.
It is incorrect to argue that taxation at the corporate level is nec-
essary to prevent tax avoidance arising from the fact that the share-
holder may be a tax-exempt organization, or a foreign person not
subject to U.S. tax, or because the gain may be eliminated by a step-
up in basis at the death of a shareholder prior to the distribution in
complete liquidation. Each of these exemptions from tax presumably
serves some economic or social policy that Congress has seen fit to
adopt in the Internal Revenue Code. It may well be, of course, that
the scope of these exemptions should be reconsidered carefully, but
there is no tax policy justification for repealing these exemptions
only with respect to gains which arise from corporate investment.
The step-up in basis at death, for example, is obviously a major loop-
hole in the tax system, but Congress for whatever reason sees fit to
retain it. It cannot properly be partially repealed in a manner that
discriminates against corporate investment.
The principal advantages claimed for repeal of General Utilities
are the elimination of the substantial complexity and uncertainty
that it creates. It is argued, for example, that repeal would permit
repeal of the collapsible corporation provisions. It is more likely that
Congress would not repeal the General Utilities concept outright,
but rather that Congress would ameliorate the effects of any such
change either by exempting section 1231 or capital assets held for
some period of years or by introducing a shareholder credit for the
corporate-level capital gains tax. If either of these steps were taken,
it might be necessary to retain the collapsible corporation provisions
and many of the other existing complexities and uncertainties that
arise out of the General Utilities concept.
Accordingly, we should not repeal General Utilities as to sales or
distributions of assets in a complete liquidation and impose a double
tax burden on asset appreciation existing at that time. An effective
tax rate of 42.4% on such gains, as opposed to a 20% rate on other
investment gains, would indeed have serious adverse economic ef-
fects, particularly on privately held companies. It could create a bias
causing owners of family companies contemplating liquidation to
merge their companies into publicly held companies in exchange for
stock of those companies. In that event, capital would not be directed
to its most efficient uses in our economy. We have developed our
existing system over a long period of years to respond to the needs of
our economy, and we can rectify abuses as was done in TEFRA and





My subject seems to be a relevant topic in connection with the
discussion of General Utilities' primarily because publicly held lim-
ited partnerships, which are a developing form of business, provide a
form of integration.
First, it may be useful to all of you to know what some of the non-
tax lawyers are saying about publicly held limited partnerships. The
American Bar Association in its annual meeting in 1983 had a pro-
gram on the use of publicly traded limited partnerships presented by
the section of Corporations, Banking and Business Law. A brief ex-
cerpt from the edited transcript of that program is interesting. The
statement was made that
Public partnerships ... are a part of what one of our panelists . . .has
referred to as the devolution of corporate assets into direct ownership. The
public partnership vehicle is currently addressing valuation mismatches that
have occurred in the corporate world. Those of you who have followed the
various takeover battles will be familiar with the results of market under-
valuation of business assets. The public partnerships to a great extent deal
with the same types of discontinuity that have generated the takeover
activity.
2
The same theme was developed in an article published in the Au-
gust 1983 issue of the Business Lawyer.' There the author said this:
"The time has come to give serious thought to using the limited
* Visiting Adjunct Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A.; J.D.,
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partnership form for the conduct of widely held businesses. In many
cases, it would be highly advantageous for existing corporations to
liquidate and thereafter operate as limited partnerships."4 At about
the same time, Forbes magazine reported on what it called "Dis-
incorporating America."5 That story was prompted by the creation
of several so-called master partnerships, the vehicle used for both
widely held and publicly traded limited partnerships. The first of
these it reported to be The Apache Petroleum Co. and, according to
Forbes, this was followed by a spin-off by Masonite corporation of
its timberlands and sawmills as a partnership in August 1982, and a
spin-off by Newhall Land & Farming of its commercial real estate
into a partnership in March 1982. The Forbes article reported that
euphoria was reigning among many executives who saw this as a
way to avoid the corporate income tax without giving up any of the
significant advantages of a corporation.
Soon after the Forbes article appeared, the staff of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee reported its recommendations for overhauling Sub-
chapter C.6 This report had what was a surprise, I'm sure, for some
syndicators of tax shelters and those euphoric executives and lawyers
who were then actively promoting publicly traded limited partner-
ships: a recommendation that publicly traded limited partnerships be
treated as corporations. The report stated that
[T]he only relevant abuse examined by the staff [in connection with the
classification of business entities] has been the recent proliferation of pub-
licly traded limited partnerships. Beginning in 1981, the New York Stock
Exchange has listed certain limited partnership interests. As a result, inves-
tors are able to invest in large scale tax-exempt business enterprises.7
In a footnote to that report, it states that 676 partnerships, each
with more than one thousand partners, had gross receipts of nearly
six billion dollars and net income of nearly one and a half billion
dollars in 1980. 8 The report went on to say: "It is difficult to explain
why such large centralized business organizations should be exempt
from tax while ordinary corporations are subject to an entity level
tax. Thus, the American Law Institute has recommended that lim-
ited partnerships with publicly traded interests should not be treated
as partnerships."9
That was indeed the ALI recommendation, but it was made for a
somewhat different reason. The ALI did not base its recommenda-
4. Id. at 1488.
5. FORBES, Aug. 1, 1983, at 134.
6. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983)
[hereinafter cited as SFC REPORT].
7. SFC REPORT, supra note 6, at 50-51.
8. Id. at 51 n.60.
9. Id. at 51.
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tion on fairness so much as it did on the administrative and compli-
ance complexity of dealing with large publicly held limited
partnerships.
There was also activity in the House of Representatives on the
same basic question in 1983. On October 25, certain members of the
Democractic Study Group, who were identified in the Daily Tax Re-
port as "liberal Democrats," published a proposed amendment to
HR 4170 that would treat as a corporation any limited partnership
having more than a hundred partners. 10 That proposal was rejected
by the American Law Institute at the same time that it considered
the publicly traded limited partnership. The American Law Institute
believed that there should be no limit as to the numbers of partners
that could exist in a limited partnership that would be accorded
partnership status. Its basic premise was that there really was not
sufficient unfairness in the current disparate treatment of limited
partnerships and corporations to justify the type of uncertainty that
exists today as to the classification of partnerships. They rejected the
idea that the numbers of limited partners should have any impact on
the classification question.
A good deal of controversy erupted over these two proposals when
the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee held their meetings. The Senate Finance Committee
hearings were held in October 1983. The Ways and Means Commit-
tee addressed the same subject in February 1984. It was suggested
at the mid-winter meeting of the American Bar Association that the
recommendation on entity classification had become the most contro-
versial issue in the staff report. After hearing the debate over the
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, whether that is true or not
remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, Legal Times reported that major law firms from
Chicago, New York, Dallas, San Francisco, Houston, and Washing-
ton D.C. had all been retained to represent fifteen companies with a
big stake in the entity classification issue. Three principal arguments
were advanced by the opponents of the staff's recommendation. The
first was that publicly traded limited partnerships are no more like
corporations than other limited partnerships and should, therefore,
be accorded similar treatment. However, that argument cuts both
ways. The fact that two types of transactions or entities are similar,
thus deserving similar treatment, does not suggest the direction in
10. 129 CONG. REC. H8636 (daily ed. October 25, 1983).
which the law should change. The fact of similarity is entirely neu-
tral on that issue. So, when Court Holding Co."' and General Utili-
ties created a conflict for Congress in 1954, Congress could well
have decided to repeal the General Utilities doctrine and not add
section 33712 to the Code. Congress made the other choice. Obvi-
ously, if a publicly traded limited partnership is essentially the same
as other limited partnerships, it might suggest that all limited part-
nerships should be treated as corporations.
The opponents' first argument was further developed by saying
that Congress should not approach reclassification problems on a
case-by-case basis, but that it should do it on a more conceptual
level. However, the recommendation of the staff is not necessarily
approaching the entity classification issue on a case-by-case basis. It
could be interpreted as considering that the type of free transferabil-
ity present with publicly traded partnerships, with the resulting en-
hancement in their ability to attract large numbers of investors, as a
sufficiently important corporate attribute to cause publicly traded
limited partnerships to differ substantively from other limited part-
nerships, and therefore justify their reclassification as corporations.
The premise of the opponents' argument was that publicly traded
units are not a trait intrinsic to corporations and to make the point
the opposition cites closely held corporations. In this regard, it is in-
teresting that one of the things that all the discussion and quotation
of the Morrissey13 case over the years has omitted is the statement
that the trust type of organization facilitates, as does corporate or-
ganization, the transfer of beneficial interests without affecting the
continuity of the enterprise. It also facilitates the introduction of
large numbers of participants. Although the staff report made no
mention of this, its recommendation could find significant conceptual
support in the Morrissey case.
The second principal argument against reclassification advanced
at these hearings was that the administrative difficulties of taxing
limited partnerships having large numbers of partners and many
changes in partnership ownership during the year have been over-
rated. TEFRA made changes in the audit provisions of partnerships
which do eliminate some of the problems of administration because
the Internal Revenue Service can now audit the partnership and
make changes in partnership items that will extend the statute of
limitations for the individual partners so that those adjustments can
be made on the individual partner's returns. Secondly, the point was
made that computers have now made it possible to keep up with the
11. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
12. I.R.C. § 337 (1982).
13. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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various allocations necessary when there are large numbers of
changes in partners and large numbers of partners, even to the point
of making the appropriate optional adjustments to basis. I think that
probably is feasible today.
What the opposition does not emphasize, but what may well be
the major administrative problem, is the enormous flood of
paperwork that would be generated for the Treasury and the Service
if there are a significant number of publicly held limited partner-
ships with large numbers of partners. A change in a partnership item
that is one which the Code and Regulations require to be separately
stated may not often result in an easy and standard adjustment to be
made to the returns of the individual partners. For example, a
change in the interest deduction of a partnership when it flows
through will have to be individually treated by each partner in order
to determine limitations on investment interest. Likewise, a change
in the amount of capital gain or loss or section 123114 gains or losses
will result in an individual recomputation for each partner. I foresee
millions of individual audits being required to make certain that all
those adjustments are made properly at the partner level.
One suggestion that I might make if there is no entity reclassifica-
tion is that, when there are changes made at the partnership level
the individual partners should have an obligation to file a new re-
turn. At that point there would again be the imposition of a self-
assessment system with each partner being required to make the in-
dividualized changes required for such partner's return. Then, the
running of the statute of limitations should be suspended until the
filing of that return. That would reduce the administrative burdens
of the government, but it would materially increase private sector
compliance costs.
The third objection that was made to the reclassification of pub-
licly held limited partnerships was not so much an objection to the
concept as it was a rebuttal to the thought that the reclassification
was necessary to avoid a stampede of corporations being liquidated
into partnerships and partnerships being organized instead of corpo-
rations. Potential tax liabilities on conversion to partnership form are
one substantial impediment. Certainly that would be true if the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine were to be repealed.
Two significant operational problems were also discussed. One was
that there is no perpetual existence for partnerships. I doubt the ac-
14. I.R.C. § 1231 (1982).
curacy of that premise. Partnership statutes generally state that the
certificate has to state a term for the partnership, but they do not
generally restrict the length of the term. Could not the term be a
thousand years or ten thousand years or even perpetual? Indeed, I
believe one of the publicly traded partnerships extant has been said
to have perpetual existence.
Another operational problem cited was that the liability of general
partners as managers will inhibit the formation of limited partner-
ships. That is not so clear a problem when you can have a corpora-
tion be the general partner under present law. Thus, professional
managers can be adequately protected by the use of corporations.
At any rate, notwithstanding the reasons given for the entity
reclassification proposal by the staff, there has been the thought that
repeal of the General Utilities doctrine might provide a further in-
centive towards the use of partnerships instead of corporations. Fur-
ther, with no entity level tax on partnerships, the General Utilities
issue has not been an issue in the partnership tax scheme. When
there are distributions made to partners there is no tax at the part-
nership level unless you run afoul of the section 75115 collapsible
partnership provisions and then that does not impose two taxes be-
cause basis adjustments will preserve the single tax scheme.
Since the General Utilities doctrine is an amelioration of the full
entity level taxation on corporations, its existence does lessen the ad-
vantage that the single tax scheme gives to partnerships. However,
there is a question as to how frequently that issue is a factor consid-
ered when corporations are organized. It may receive considerable
attention by people who are forming collapsible corporations; indeed,
it is an elementary principle necessary to consider when forming a
collapsible corporation. However, to those people who are forming
corporations that are planned to continue and perhapi grow large,
that doctrine is one which simply does not appear in the literature as
influencing the choice of entity and it is doubtful that it has much, if
any, impact on the choice. Nevertheless, the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine has been widely stated as a negative factor in the
use of corporations for business entities. Therefore this doctrine may
have an impact that is difficult to foresee.
There are probably two principal reasons that have prompted the
attempt to reclassify some limited partnerships as corporations. The
first and foremost is the general disenchantment with tax shelters.
Tax shelters for the masses are available primarily through syndica-
tions. As promoters reach out to greater numbers of investors with
smaller and smaller amounts to invest, the numbers of SEC regis-
tered offerings and presumably publicly traded limited partnerships
15. I.R.C. § 751 (1982).
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can be expected to increase. Taxing them as corporations would cer-
tainly inhibit their growth and would effectively limit tax shelters. It
would not affect the shelter itself, which would still be available to
those who did not need to participate in syndicates to enjoy them.
Thus, they would be largely available to individuals with enough
wealth to invest on their own, so the proposal really can be seen,
ironically, as an anti-populist measure.
Perhaps a more logical solution is that of the American Law Insti-
tute which is to deny the deductibility of partnership losses except
from operating income from those same partnerships. That does not
directly attack the special privileges or incentive provisions in the
Code and those would remain viable as tax shelters for individuals
who did not have to get involved in partnerships. Therefore, the most
rational solution would be to chip away at the special privileges and
incentives that exist in the Code without any restriction on the use of
those provisions by partnerships, making those tax shelters remain
available to many people instead of just a few.
The second principal reason that has been given for promoting en-
tity reclassification is the reason given by the staff of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee: fairness. That, of course, involves the question of
whether or not limited partnerships that are publicly traded so re-
semble corporations that they should be taxed in the same way. In
defense of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine it was said
that if some corporations must pay a tax on their gains, all should. I
certainly agree with that, but the problem of determining what is a
corporation is also a necessary question to address in achieving fair-
ness among entities. The recommendation by the Senate Committee
staff can be seen to be a judgment on the same resemblance test that
we find in Morrissey, and that has been posed by Congress for the
Treasury and taxpayers from the beginnings of federal income tax.
Ever since the 1894 Revenue Act it is quite clear that the Congress
has intended to make a distinction between corporations and part-
nerships. Corporations, joint-stock companies and associations have
been treated one way, and partnerships have been singled out for
different treatment. However, the courts have been assigned the task
of distinguishing between them.
In following that mandate, the Supreme Court could not have
done much differently than it did in the Morrissey case, that is, to
establish a resemblance test of some sort. However, in stating the
issue as to whether the entity bore sufficient resemblance to a corpo-
ration, the Court gave a narrower meaning to "corporation" than it
might have. Had it formulated the issue as one of resemblance be-
tween the entity and any of the various associations and joint-stock
companies that were clearly intended to be taxed, it might have
broadened the definition sufficiently to draw limited partnerships into
the corporation category. Had that comparison been drawn, the ab-
sence of mutual agency as between the general partners and the lim-
ited partners might have been regarded as an important factor, The
ability to hold title in the organization's name, and sue and be sued
in one's own name were stated in the Morrissey case as factors, and
they may have been regarded at an earlier time as important factors.
Whether or not the entity was a creature of statute could very well
have been regarded as an important issue. Morrissey, with respect to
corporations and trusts, implied that this was an important attribute.
Corporations were creatures of statute. What Morrissey said was
that, after Hecht v. Malley,"6 this attribute was not a necessary one
for finding the entity to be a corporation.
Limited partnerships, of course, have considerable similarities to
corporations in being creatures of statute. The filing of a certificate
of limited partnership is a precondition to the limited liability of lim-
ited partners. Likewise, the filing of a certificate of incorporation is
necessary for the existence of the corporation and, therefore, the lim-
ited liability of its shareholders. Partnership acts prescribe limits on
the names that can be used and grants limited liability to limited
partners.
As to limited partnerships, the Revised Limited Partnership Act is
moving partnerships closer to corporations than did the Uniform
Act. I believe that the Revised Act implies that partners have an
option of granting limited liability to the general partners. I have
seen at least one such agreement, drawn in Minnesota under the
Minnesota Act, that purports to eliminate personal liability for the
general partners. It is my understanding that this new provision is
the reason for the amendment the Treasury made to the regulations
saying that there must always be at least one general partner with
unlimited liability.
In 1918, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Haiku Sugar
Co.,17 did question whether the legal effect of the partnership in that
case was to create a joint-stock company rather than a partnership. I
have found no other case where the resemblance test has been stated
to be between the organization and something other than a corpora-
tion. Haiku Sugar Co. found two significant differences between a
partnership and a joint-stock company. Unlike shareholders of joint-
stock companies, the members of a partnership could not freely
16. 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
17. Haiku Sugar Co. v. Johnstone, 249 F. 103 (9th Cir. 1918).
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transfer their shares. Second, management by partners differs from
the board of managers' representative management of joint-stock
companies. The court also noted that the partnership in question had
relatively few partners drawn to each other by feelings of mutual
confidence and was therefore unlike joint-stock companies which
were said to consist of large numbers of persons among whom there
is no special relationship of confidence. Haiku Sugar Co. suggests
the possible result of adopting that test is that limited partnerships
would be taxed as corporations today; certainly it would have treated
publicly traded limited partnerships as corporations.
In closing, I might suggest a different reason to preserve partner-
ship status for publicly traded limited partnerships, the reason hav-
ing to do with full integration of the corporate and individual tax
systems. The United States has some experience with a fully inte-
grated corporate tax system, but that experience is limited. In the
1964 Act there was full integration for a catch-all group of corpora-
tions. Today there is full integration for some controlled foreign cor-
porations and S corporations. Preservation of partnership status for
publicly traded limited partnerships provides full integration for enti-
ties that resemble corporations and other associations. If that creates
a trend towards the election of full integration treatment for entities
that might normally have been taxed as corporations, it might pro-
vide the means to experiment with full integration before going all
the way or rejecting it as impractical. That might be the most sensi-
ble way of easing into full integration. In the meantime, the General
Utilities doctrine could be repealed and those who would choose full
integration as the appropriate solution could opt for that by using a
publicly traded limited partnership for business entities.

